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INTRODUCTION
Addressing non-monetary remedies to the "society as a whole" is an
underlying rationale of jurisprudence in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ("Inter-American Court"); measures awarded in this
context are intended to serve dissuasive purposes.
"Society as a whole" is a concept exclusive to the Inter-American
System, referring to all individuals of a society, regardless of social
divisions or cleavages. 1 In recent decisions, the term "society as a
whole" has been partially replaced by expressions like the "Peruvian
society" or the "Colombian society."2 The concept is particularly

1. The European Court of Human Rights uses the concept of "community as a
whole" in relation to the "public interest" of society which has to be
counterbalanced with the individual's interest. The term "community as a whole"
is thus not parallel to "society as a whole" in the Inter-American context.
Broniowski v. Poland, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 57, 59-60. Recent developments in
European jurisprudence might in general lessen the gap between the InterAmerican and European doctrines: The European Court has in some cases included
more beneficiaries within the scope of reparation. See, e.g., Sejdovic v. Italy, App.
No. 56581/00 (Grand Chamber Mar. 1, 2006) (suggesting that recent reforms to
the Code of Criminal Procedure could be sufficient to remedy a systemic problem
in the administration of justice); Broniowski, 2004-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.See generally
Valerio Colandrea, On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to
Order Specific Non-monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the Assanidze,
Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 396 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 140, 217 (Jan. 31, 2006) (recognizing that the Colombian society
had a right to know the truth regarding human rights violations in accordance with
the American Convention on Human Rights); G6mez Palomino v. Peru, 2005
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136,
78 (Nov. 22, 2005) (discussing that if
Peruvian society knows the truth regarding human rights violations, it may find
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used in the context of the right to the truth.' Although the court does
not recognize that the "society as a whole" has a right to the truth, 4 it
repeatedly states that the victims' and next of kin's right to the truth
coincides with an expectation of the society as a whole.' Apart from
this explicit use of the concept, the Inter-American Court awards a
wide range of measures that de facto benefit "society as a whole"
6
rather than only or primarily the individual victim.
Although the Inter-American Court explicitly excludes a punitive
meaning in reparation awards,' Judge Can~ado Trindade argues that
some reparation measures in the Inter-American system reveal a
dissuasive or exemplary aspect.' Dinah Shelton generally links the
dissuasive function of remedies to the needs of the society: "In
addition to redressing individual injury and sanctioning wrongdoers,
remedies serve societal needs." 9 This observation allows for the
following argument to be made: When a non-monetary remedy is
ways to prevent similar violations in the future).

3. See Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101,
274 (Nov. 25, 2003) (reaffirming the theory that next of kin and "society as a
whole" have the right to know the truth regarding human rights violations, and that
this right is an important form of reparation).
4. See Douglass Cassel, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in
VICTIMS UN-SILENCED 151, 160 (Catherine A. Sunshine & M6nica Avila Paulette
eds., Gretta K. Siebentritt trans., 2007), available at http://www.dplf.org/
uploads/l190403828.pdf (pointing out that the court's "language" regarding
society as a whole is "dictum").
5. Mack Chang, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 274 (Nov. 25,
2003).
6. See, e.g., Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, 1993 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15,
96 (Sept. 10, 1993) (requiring Suriname to reopen a school in Gujaba and create
a permanent medical dispensary as reparation to the Saramaka tribe which has
been affected by human rights violations).
7. See Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 7, 38 (July 21, 1989) (interpreting "fair compensation," as used in Article
63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, to include damages meant to
compensate the victim, but not damages designed to punish the responsible state
party). But see discussion infra Part II.B (addressing the view that exclusion of
punitive damages from the definition of "fair compensation" is not appropriate).
8. See Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 160, 55 (Nov. 25, 2006) (Reasoned Vote of Judge Cangado Trindade); Plan
de S~inchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, 25
(Nov. 19, 2004) (Reasoned Vote of Judge Cangado Trindade) (arguing that one of
the purposes of reparations is to guarantee the harmful acts will not be repeated).
9. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 354
(2005).
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explicitly or de facto directed to the "society as a whole," it is an
indication that the judge considered the immediate need to efficiently
and effectively redress the violation and especially to prevent its
recurrence.
Prevention of recurrence cannot be achieved without considering
the wider societal, legislative, executive, and judicial measures in the
respective states. Inter-American jurisprudence reveals an overall
consistent "working theory"' 0 of dissuasive intent in the court's
orders. While the term "punitive measures" is not appropriate to
describe this practice because of a misleading resemblance to its use
in criminal law, the term "dissuasive measures" suitably captures the
intent of the judges of the Inter-American Court. Measures ordered
pursuant to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on
Human Rights ("ACHR") exemplify this practice," and reparations
granted pursuant to Article 63(1) of the ACHR confirm that the court
orders dissuasive measures.12
This Article analyzes the reparation jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Court in such a manner as to explore these assertions,
particularly focusing on the question of who is the explicit or implicit
beneficiary of each measure. In addition, this Article concentrates on
measures that reach beyond individual victims to their next of kin or
"society as a whole." Finally, this Article addresses the court's aim
to strengthen democracy and the rule of law.
10. See Clara Sandoval, A Critical View of the Protection of Refugees and
IDPs by the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Re-assessing Its Powers and
Examining the Challengesfor the Future, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 43, 47-48 (2005)

(explaining the concept of "working theory" as the "legal and political assumptions
S..

the Court deploy[s] in [its] daily work when having to interpret and apply the

law of the system").
11. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human
Rights arts. 1(l)-(2), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter ACHR] (delineating general state obligations).
12. See id. art. 63(1) (providing that where a violation of a right or freedom
protected under the ACHR occurs, the Inter-American Court shall require the
reinstatement of that right or freedom and, where appropriate, order remedies and
fair compensation to the injured party); see also Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, 1998
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, 164 (Nov. 27, 1998) (requiring Peru to amend
domestic laws so that they conform with the ACHR); Mack Chang v.
Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101,
286 (Nov. 25, 2003)
(ordering the state to name a street or square after the victim and place a prominent
plaque nearby referencing her activities).
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I. INDIVIDUALS AS BENEFICIARIES OF
REPARATION AWARDS
As a starting point, it is critical to examine the role of the
individual victim in reparation decisions. Analyzing the role of the
individual victim facilitates an understanding of the concept of
"society as a whole" and its relation to the dissuasive purpose of
measures granted by the court.
Article 63(1) of the ACHR entitles "the injured party" to the
cessation of the violation, restoration of his or her rights, and
reparations.13 In Mack Chang v. Guatemala, the Inter-American
Court interpreted "injured party" to be coextensive with those who
are considered victims of the violation.14 This correlation has been
maintained throughout the years. 5 Over time, however, the court's
definition of "victims of a violation" has changed, resulting in a
broader interpretation of the term "injured party."
A. THE INDIVIDUAL VICTIM

In its early jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court interpreted
Article 63(1) of the ACHR as being exclusively victim-centered. In
Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, for instance, the court ordered the
unconditional release of the victim to restore her right to freedom of
movement. 16 In the same spirit, the court held that reparations must
be made "solely to those persons who suffer the immediate effects of
its unlawful acts."' 7 The court adhered to the "traditional principles

13. ACHR, supra note 11, art. 63(1).
14. Mack Chang, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 242.
15. See Goiburi v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, 145
(Sept. 22, 2006) (identifying the victims of the violation as the "injured party" and
the appropriate beneficiary of reparations ordered by the court).
16. See Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33, 84
(Sept. 17, 1997) (ordering the release of a victim who was convicted in violation of
the ACHR's prohibition against double jeopardy).
17. JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 237 (2003) (discussing the court's refusal to

grant reparations to all individuals who claim to have been adversely affected by a
state's human rights violations); see, e.g., Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, 1993 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15, 49 (Sept. 10, 1993) (discussing how reparations should
only be made to a party who has suffered from "the immediate effects" of a human
rights violation and who has a "legally recognized" injury).
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on causation" to argue in favor of the victim-centered view of
reparations and obligations of non-recurrence. 18 Therefore, in order
for additional victims to benefit from the court's ruling, the InterAmerican Commission would have to join claims and refer cases to
the Inter-American Court involving multiple victims.19 Hilaire v.
Trinidad & Tobago, concerning thirty-two petitions on the death row
phenomenon, ° Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru and
Baena-Ricardo v. Panama,2 addressing the joinder of petitions
brought by members of trade unions,2" are examples of the InterAmerican Commission's attempt to join claims involving multiple
victims.
Considering the court's contentious jurisdiction over individual
violations, it is not surprising that it can only award reparations to the
victims of a violation.23 Admissibility criteria,24 as well as rules
relating to the burden25 and standard of proof, 6 are tailored to
guarantee individual consideration of cases.27 However, this does not
18. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 17, at 237.
19. See id. at 238-39 (noting that despite the Inter-American Commission's
efforts to increase fair treatment by referring multiple victim cases to the InterAmerican Court, few victims actually receive reparations from the court's
judgments).
20. Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
1-3 (June 21, 2002) (resulting from the joinder of cases submitted separately to
the Inter-American Court against Trinidad and Tobago).
21. Baena-Ricardo v. Panama, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 72,
4, 6
(Feb. 2, 2001) (recognizing 270 public employees as victims in this case).
22. Dismissed Congressional Employees v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 158, 132 (Nov. 24, 2006) (finding that Peru violated the rights of 257
victims).
23. ACHR, supra note 11, art. 63(1).
24. ACHR, supra note 11, arts. 46-47, 61-62 (requiring petitioners to pursue
domestic remedies, where available, prior to applying to the Inter-American
Commission); Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rules of Procedure, arts.
33-34, Nov. 25, 2003, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cftn
[hereinafter IACHR Rules of Procedure].
25. Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
123 (July 29, 1988). See generally PASQUALUCCI, supra note 17, at 210 (noting
that according to fundamental tenets of law, the burden of proof is initially and
generally on the applicant).
26. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 17, at 213 (explaining that international law
generally avoids rigid standards of proof and the Inter-American Court has the
ability to consider the evidence as it sees fit).
27. IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 24, arts. 44-50 (detailing the
specific procedures by which evidence and witness testimony will be admitted).
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prevent the court from defining the term "victim" in a broad sense,
thus permitting the possibility for a group to be the victim of a
violation and hence the beneficiary of reparation.
B. THE CONCEPT OF "NEXT OF KIN"-THE GROUP VIEW ON
BENEFICIARIES OF REPARATIONS

Generally, "[t]he Court considers that the expression 'next of kin'
of the victim should be interpreted in a broad sense to include all
persons related by close kinship."28 The Inter-American Court
employs the expression "next of kin" in two different, but related
contexts. In one context, the court refers to the next of kin when
deciding who will inherit the compensation that a deceased victim
would normally receive as a reparation award related to Article 4 of
the ACHR.2 9 Second, the concept of a victim's next of kin may also
refer to those who suffered violations of their human rights protected
under Articles 5, 8, and 25 of the ACHR in their own right if the
original violation was under Articles 4, 5, or 7 of the ACHR.30
However, in the latter context, the Inter-American Court has set
several conditions that must be met, including the
existence of a relationship of regular and effective financial support
between the victim and the claimant, the possibility of realistically
presuming that this support would have continued if the victim had not
died, and that the claimant would have had a financial
need that was
31
regularly satisfied by the support provided by the victim.

28. Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, 92
(Nov. 27, 1998) (including within this definition children, parents, and siblings).
29. See Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 140, TT 240-241 (Jan. 31, 2006) (awarding compensation in equal halves to the
victim's children and wife or permenant companion, or in the absence of such
individuals, in equal halves to parents and siblings); Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El
Salvador, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120,
210 (Mar. 1, 2005)
(establishing a method whereby monetary reparations unclaimed by victims after
more than ten years would be distributed equally among the victims' siblings).
Also, children born outside of wedlock are considered potential heirs. Cf Garrido
v. Argentina, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39,
54, 56 (Aug. 27, 1998).
30. Paniagua-Morales v. Guatemala, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 76,
85 (May 25, 2001).
31. Id.
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The Inter-American Court has used the concept of "next of kin" in
both meanings throughout its jurisprudence, and has thus
consistently widened its scope. In Velcisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras,

the court defined "next of kin" as the widow and children of a victim
who disappeared.32 Soon after, the court adapted the concept to the
special family structures of the Saramaka tribe in Suriname.33 The
court found Suriname's argument unpersuasive that the first and
second wives of the victims, as well as their children, had to be
treated on an equal footing since polygamy is the normal form of
family life within the tribe.34 However, the court did not rule in favor
of the Inter-American Commission's request to broaden the concept
of family to include the entire Saramaka tribe.35 The court did not
grant this request, arguing that the community is "redressed by the
enforcement of the system of laws."36 Yet, as Shelton highlights, the
order of reopening a school could nevertheless be seen as a measure
of "'just satisfaction' to the community as a whole."37
The concept of "next of kin" has undergone further amplification
throughout the years. In El Amparo v. Venezuela, the Inter-American
Court for the first time recognized that an unmarried female
companion has the same status as a wife in non-indigenous
societies.38 Furthermore, in G6mez Palomino v. Peru, the court

32. Velisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7,
58 (July 21, 1989).
62
33. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, 1993 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15,
(Sept. 10, 1993) (interpreting the term "next of kin" based on tribal definitions
instead of domestic provisions of family law unless the tribal understanding is
contrary to the ACHR).
34. Id. 97(a) (granting one-third to multiple wives and two-thirds to their
children of the reparations otherwise due to the deceased victims).
35. Id. 83 (holding that, although all individuals are part of both a family and
community, "the obligation to pay moral compensation does not extend to such
communities"). Compensation to the community may be in rare cases granted if it
suffered direct damages.
36. Id. 83.
37. SHELTON, supra note 9, at 286.
38. El Amparo v. Venezuela, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 28, 41(c)
(Sept. 14, 1996). The court confirmed this view by granting beneficiary status
equally to all biological children the victim had with different wives, and to his
stepchildren. L6pez-Alvarez v. Honduras, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
141, 187 (Feb. 1, 2006).
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granted reparations in the form of a scholarship with either the
39
victim's siblings or their children being eligible for its receipt.
To summarize, granting reparation measures to the "next of kin"
enlarges the concept of individual redress. The fact that the ACHR
considers family the basic unit of society supports this view.4" The
court's readiness to include grandparents, companions, non-relative
dependents, and, more recently, emotionally distant siblings,4'

demonstrates the commitment of the court to redress damages
incurred by "next of kin" who have suffered as a result of a violation.
Recently, the court observed in Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia
that moral damages to siblings can be assumed.42
C. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND MEASURES DIRECTED TO
"MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY"

In Plan de Stinchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Moiwana Community
v. Suriname, Yakye Axci Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, and
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the InterAmerican Court identified a special need to grant reparation

39. G6mez Palomino v. Peru, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, 146
(Nov. 22, 2005) (observing the impact of the violation on the family's "future
generations").
40. ACHR, supra note 11, art. 17(1) ("The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
state."); cf SHELTON, supra note 9, at 245 (recognizing the court's difficulty in
accurately valuing and calculating damages for members of the victim's family).
41. See Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101,
245 (Nov. 25, 2003) (granting reparations to a woman proven to be the sister of
the victim even though she had not participated in the court proceedings); see also
Bdmaca Veldsquez v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91, 52
(Feb. 22, 2002) (giving considerable weight to the "Mayan custom that the elder
son usually contributes to the sustenance" of his immediate family). But see
Castillo-Pdiez v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, 89 (Nov. 27,
1998) (granting the sister of the victim moral compensation, but only after finding
she suffered as a result of her brother's death); Garrido v. Argentina, 1998 Inter63-64 (Aug. 27, 1998) (illustrating the court's
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39,
more restrictive view of compensation for moral damages to family members who
failed to supply sufficient evidence demonstrating an "affective relationship" with
the victim).
42. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
140, 257 (Jan. 31, 2006) ("[T]he Court has presumed that the suffering or death
of a person causes their children, spouse or companion, mother, father, and siblings
a non-pecuniary damage that need not be proved.").

136
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measures to members of indigenous communities whose rights had
been violated.43 It is very interesting to note that in Moiwana
Community, the court granted development measures directly to the
community, although it did not consider the community a beneficiary
in the relevant section of the judgment." This contradiction would
lead to the conclusion that a collective understanding of "the injured
party" is not established jurisprudence; yet, in the recent case of an
indigenous leader who was killed by military personnel, the court did
not refer to the individual members of the community when awarding
development measures, but to the community. The court granted a
$40,000 fund to the benefit of the community which should be used
according to its customs, forms of consultation, and traditions.45 In
the light of the conception that indigenous communities have of their
own social structure this interpretation should be regarded as the
more adequate one.
However, it is important to remember that compensation for
damages requires a higher standard of proof than general reparation
measures. 46 Therefore, in order to be eligible for damages, an
indigenous community might need to specify all of its members in
the claim.47

43. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 112 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community
v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter- Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, 188 (June 17, 2005);
Moiwana Community v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
194 (June 15, 2005); Plan de Sdnchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, 86 (Nov. 19, 2004).
44. Moiwana Community, 2005 Inter- Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, T 187
(granting material damages to members of the community, but not to the
community itself).
45. Escu6 Zapata v. Colombia, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165,
7 168. (July 4, 2007). In this case, the representatives of the victims had requested
several measures that would enable the indigenous community to reconstruct their
customs and traditions. The claim requested measures related to jurisdictional
autonomy and land rights of the Nasa people. The court rejected this request, as
well as the commission's request for the establishment of a youth leadership
program, arguing that the claims were not related to the facts of the case. Id.
180-185.
46. Id. TT 191-192.
47. Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
125, 189; Plan de Sinchez Massacre, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116,

TT 66-68.
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However, in an earlier decision addressing the property and land
rights of a Nicaraguan indigenous community, the Inter-American
Court awarded $50,000 to the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community, without specifying the individual members of the
group.48 The "collective interest for the benefit of the Awas Tingni
Community" was decisive for the court's award. 49 But other
reparation measures, such as the demarcation and legal ownership of
the community's land, were awarded to "members of the Awas
Tingni Community."5
In Plan de Sinchez Massacre, the court again listed all the victims
of the Maya Achi community individually,51 but later allowed for the
aggregation of victims, including unidentified victims, if they could
provide proof of identity.52 The court came to the same conclusion in
Moiwana Community v. Suriname,5 3 and Mapiriptin Massacre v.
54

Colombia.

In all of these cases, the Inter-American Court granted reparation
measures in the form of development programs.55 These programs
included development funds;5 6 more specific measures like housing,
48. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 167 (Aug. 31, 2001) (providing reparations in the form
of investment in infrastructural works or services).
49. Id.
50. Id. 164 (emphasis added).
51. Plan de Sdnchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 105, $$ 42(47)-42(48) (Apr. 29, 2004).
52. Plan de Sdnchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 116, 62 (Nov. 19, 2004).
53. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
124, 178 (June 15, 2005).
54. Mapiripdin Massacre v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
134, 1 247 (Sept. 15, 2005).
55. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 1 224 (Mar. 29, 2006) (ordering the State to
establish a fund for educational, housing, agricultural, and health projects, and to
provide potable water and sanitary infrastructure for the community); Yakye Axa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125,
205 (June 17, 2005) (ordering that a community fund and program be developed
to provide potable water, sanitary infrastructure, and the "implementation of
education, housing, agricultural, and health programs"); Moiwana Community,
2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124,
213-214 (creating a developmental
fund for "health, housing, and educational programs for the ... community").
56. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 146, 224; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct.
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health, production, and infrastructure programs;57 a program
providing for subsistence needs;58 or communication systems for
health emergencies.59 The court also granted resettlement measures
in two cases where the communities concerned were displaced in the
aftermath of violations that occurred in their villages.60
Even though the concept of "next of kin," in conjunction with the
above mentioned interpretation of "community," extends the number
of beneficiaries of reparation, it does not fundamentally change the
approach of the ACHR. The ACHR favors the individual that
suffered a violation of his or her rights, rather than any form of
collective redress that might be independent from the notion of the
individual "injured party."
The Inter-American Court is nevertheless ready to abandon its
individual-centered doctrine in favor of a more encompassing
approach, considering that cases frequently reveal a pattern, and not
a single violation. 61 The court does not expand the scope of the
"victim" concept, but rather that of the beneficiary of reparations by
chiefly referring to society's role in pursuing the aim of nonrecurrence of violations.62

H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, 205; Moiwana Community, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 124, % 213-214.
57. Plan de Sdinchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 116, TT 109-110 (Nov. 19, 2004).
58. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
230 (ordering Paraguay to adopt measures necessary to supply the
No. 146,
community with potable water, healthcare, food, sanitation facilities, and
educational resources).
59. Id. 7232.
60. Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148,
404 (July 1, 2006) (establishing that the State provide security and resettlement
assistance to former inhabitants who decide to return to the community);
Mapiripdn Massacre v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134,
311 (v) (Sept. 15, 2005).
61. See Goibur-6 v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, 82
(Sept. 22, 2006) (stating that state responsibility is increased when the violation is
part of a systematic pattern). See generally SHELTON, supra note 9, at 154
(commenting that many states have declared general amnesties for those officials
involved in disappearances, torture, or arbitrary killings).
62. See id. at 99 (remarking that the "concern for victims not part of the
litigation as well as for potential victims, must be among the factors taken into
account in affording remedies").
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II. REPARATION ADDRESSED TO THE "SOCIETY
AS A WHOLE"
At first glance, the term "society as a whole" recalls, in a phonetic
analogy, the definition attributed to erga omnes obligations which
refer to the "international community as a whole."6 3 The problem
with this parallel is that "society as a whole" has legal consequences
different from that of "international community as a whole." 64 For
instance, the Inter-American Court does not imply that all individuals
in society (parallel to "all States" in the international arena) can
claim to be victims if certain human rights violations occur in their
society. 65 Erga omnes concerns state reaction to an internationally
wrongful act, 66 while "society as a whole" is a sociological entity to
whom certain reparation measures are addressed. 67 Society as a
whole is not considered an "injured party," as proven in the court's
rejection of the Inter-American Commission's argument in Urrutiav.
Guatemala that forcing someone to broadcast false statements causes
68
damage to an entire society.
However, the court suggests a wider understanding of erga omnes
obligations than usually accepted in general international law,
asserting:
[M]odern human rights treaties in general, and the [ACHR] in particular,
are not multilateral treaties of the traditional type ....

Their object and

purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings
irrespective of... all other contracting States. In concluding these human
rights treaties, the States can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal
order within which they, for the common good, assume various

63. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970

I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
64. See id. (explaining that a state's obligations to the "international
community as a whole" are inherently of international concern because every state
has a legal stake in such obligations).
65. See IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 24, art. 2 (defining a victim as
a "person whose rights have been violated, according to a judgment pronounced by
the Court").
66. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd., 1970 I.C.J. at 32.
67. See SHELTON, supra note 9, at 100 ("If society as a whole is injured by
human fights violations, so also may society as a whole benefit from public
remedies.").
68. Urrutia v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103,
99(c),
168 (Nov. 27, 2003).

AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.

[23:127

to other States, but towards all individuals
obligations, not in relation
69
within their jurisdiction.

While the Inter-American Court has not explicitly interpreted society
as being "all individuals within [a] jurisdiction," it can be reasonably
claimed that there is a link between the court's reading of erga
omnes and "society as a whole." Shelton asserts that erga omnes
obligations require a deterrent element in corresponding reparation
awards;70 it seems further possible to claim that the use of "society as
a whole" can be interpreted as an indication for the award of
dissuasive measures.
A. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT'S EXPLICIT USE OF THE
CONCEPT

The term "society as a whole" was introduced by the InterAmerican Commission in Aloeboetoe v. Suriname when it argued
that because the Saramaka tribe interprets family in a broad sense,
the State should be required to compensate the "whole society" for
the emotional damage incurred. 7 ' The term "whole society" in this
case meant the Saramaka tribe, not the whole society of Suriname. 2
The current use of the concept "society as a whole" emanated
from the Inter-American Commission's request in CaballeroDelgado v. Colombia. The commission sought a public
69. The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion), 1982 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) No. 2, 29 (Sept. 24, 1982). It is important to note that there is no explicit
reference to erga omnes obligations in the document. See U.N. Comm'n on Human
Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. Of Minorities, Study
Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitationfor Victims
of Gross Violations of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, 45, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (submitted by Theo van Boven) (providing a
similar interpretation of erga omnes). The concept has not been included in the
final version of the document. See generally U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Violation of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/35 (Mar. 8, 2005) (submitted by Adrian Severin).
70. SHELTON, supra note 9, at 49.
19, 83
71. Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, 1993 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15,
(Sept. 10, 1993).
72. Id. 19. See supra Part I.C (discussing the line of jurisprudence following
this decision).
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acknowledgment of state responsibility and public apology to the
relatives of the victim and "society as a whole. '73 For the first time,
the commission meant for the term "society as a whole" to refer to
society at the national level. 74 The Inter-American Court approved
this interpretation of the concept in Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, and set
a precedent for its use in respect to Article 1(1): "Finally, according
to the general obligation established in Article 1(1) of the [ACHR],
the State has the obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure that
these grave violations are not repeated, an obligation whose
fulfillment benefits society as a whole. 7 5 The concept is mentioned
in a second context of disappearance cases, this time referring
explicitly to reparations according to Article 63(1): "[T]he right of
the victim's next of kin to know what has happened to the him [sic]
and, when appropriate, where the mortal remains are, constitute a
measure of reparation and, therefore, an expectation that the State
should satisfy for the next of kin and society as a whole. 76
To date, ample use of the concept can be observed in connection
with the right to the truth7 7 as established in Almonacid Arellano,78
Ituango Massacres v. Colombia,79 Pueblo Bello Massacre,0 and
73. Caballero-Delgado v. Colombia, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 31,
21 (Jan. 21, 1997).
74. Id. (requesting the State publicly acknowledge its responsibility both to
"the victims' relatives and to Colombian society as a whole") (emphasis added).
75. Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92, 110
(Feb. 27, 2002).
76. Id.
114 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see La Cantuta v.
Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162,
231-232 (Nov. 29, 2006)
(placing responsibility on Peru to search for the remains of the victims and provide
burial services as a form of reparation to the victims' families).
77. See SHELTON, supra note 9, at 276 (citing the Chilean Truth Commission's
observation that "only the knowledge of the truth will restore the dignity of the
victims in the public mind [and] allow their relatives and mourners to honor them
fittingly"). Balde6n Garcia v. Peru represents an exception; the right to the truth
has only been linked to the family of the victim, although the Commission
requested a more encompassing understanding. Balde6n Garcia v. Peru, 2006
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)No. 147,
13 1(n), 167 (Apr. 6, 2006).
78. Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154,
157 (Sept. 26, 2006) (ordering Chile to make public the results of the
investigation "so that the Chilean society may know the truth" about the case).
79. Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148,
300 (July 1,2006) (discussing how Colombia's failure to investigate and punish
human rights violations prevents society from learning the truth).
80. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
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Huilca-Tecse v. Peru.8 1 In 19 Merchants, the Inter-American Court
argued that knowing the truth helps a society to prevent the
recurrence of such violations.82 The judges thus established an
83
explicit link to the obligation to prevent repetition of the violation.
In Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay84 and Goiburi,85 "society as a whole"
benefited from the right to the truth. In Mack Chang, the court stated
more specifically that society has a right to know about domestic
judicial processes and their outcomes.8 6
The Inter-American Court also uses the concept in the context of
impunity, and states in Ituango Massacres, Pueblo Bello, and
Maritza Urrutia that it is a detriment to "society as a whole" if
impunity is not brought to an end in cases of serious human rights
violations.87 Therefore, it can be said that the trial and punishment of

140,

267 (Jan. 31, 2006) (ordering Colombia to publicize the results of criminal

proceedings concerning a massacre "so that Colombian society may know the
truth"). This case also provides a doctrinal analysis of the right to truth. Id. 219.
81. Huilca-Tecse v. Peru, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121,
107
(Mar. 3, 2005) (ordering Peru to publicize results of an extrajudicial execution trial
so that "Peruvian society may know the truth").
82. 19 Merchants v. Colombia, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109,
7 259, 263 (July 5, 2004) (noting that investigating, identifying, and punishing the
responsible parties reveals the truth about such crimes and thus prevents future
occurrences).
83. Id. 259; see Ituango Massacres, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
148, 300 (explaining that the failure of a state to meet such an obligation results
in society's continuing ignorance of the truth).
84. Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 155, 81
(Sept. 26, 2006) ("[T]he imperious need to avoid repetition can only be satisfied by
fighting impunity and by respecting the right of victims and society as a whole to
know the truth .... "); Servell6n-Garcia v. Honduras, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 152, 196 (Sept. 21, 2006).
85. Goiburfi v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, T 164-165
(Sept. 22, 2006) (requiring Paraguay to conduct an investigation to identify and
prosecute those responsible and then publicize the results so that the people of
Paraguay can learn the truth).
86. Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101,
275 (Nov. 25, 2003) ("The outcome of the proceeding must be made known to
the public, for Guatemalan society to know the truth."); see Montero-Aranguren v.
Venezuela, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150,
150 (July 5, 2006)
(praising Venezuela's acknowledgement of responsibility for violations during a
public hearing); Ituango Massacres, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148,
399 (ordering that the results of criminal proceedings be published by the state
"so that Colombian society may know the truth").
87. Ituango Massacres, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, T 300;
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a perpetrator according to the standards of justice help strengthen
society's trust in the judicial institutions and the rule of law.
Finally, the concept appears in the context of the obligation to
investigate, try, and punish the perpetrators, and the right to judicial
remedy: "[A]ny person who considers himself or herself to be a
victim of such violations has the right to resort to the system of
justice to attain compliance with this duty by the State, for his or her
benefit and that of society as a whole." 88
The Inter-American Court points out that individuals exist within
the fabric of society, and reinforces a view taken in "Street
Children" v. Guatemala when it refers to the role each individual
plays in society. 89 The court states that a child should live a

Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140,
146 (Jan. 31, 2006) (expressing the idea that by failing to inform society of the
whole truth, a state "reproduces the conditions of impunity" that may lead to a
repetition of the violations); Urrutia v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 103, 176 (Nov. 27, 2003) (stating that impunity "constitutes a violation of
the state's obligation that harms ...

the whole of society, and encourages chronic

repetition of ... human rights violations"); see Humberto Snchez v. Honduras,
2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99,
185 (June 7, 2003) (explaining that
impunity violates a state's duty to "society as a whole" and "fosters chronic
recidivism" of violations); Bulacio v. Argentina, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 100,
120-121 (Sept. 18, 2003) (stating that combatting impunity demands
that society knows the truth about past violations). Cf Las Palmeras v. Colombia,
2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 96,
53(a) (Nov. 26, 2002) (noting that
conditions of impunity such as tampering with and destroying evidence obstruct
access to the truth, making it impossible to punish human rights violations).
88. Caracazo v. Venezuela, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 95, 115
(Aug. 29, 2002); see Humberto Scnchez, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99,
184 (stating that providing judicial process to establish investigation and
punishment of violations fulfils a state duty not only to the next of kin, but also to
"society as a whole"); Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 92, 99 (Feb. 27, 2002) (noting that because the ACHR "guarantees access to
justice," Bolivia should investigate and punish human rights violations); BdmacaVeldsquez v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91,
75, 77 (Feb.
22, 2002) (extending the victims' and next of kin's right to the truth to Guatemalan
society as a means of preventing further human rights violations); CantoralBenavides v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 88,
69-70 (Dec. 3,
2001) (explaining that by allowing violations to go unpunished, a state fails to
meet its obligations to victims and next of kin and its "general duty to guarantee"
the rights of all persons within its jurisdiction).
89. "Street Children" v. Guatemala, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63,
197 (Nov. 19, 1999) (stating that the rehabilitation of street children is vital to
ensuring that they "play a constructive and productive role in society").
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"dignified life" and that "every child has the right to harbor a project
of life that should be tended and encouraged by the public authorities
so that it may develop this project for its personal benefit and that of
the society to which it belongs." 90
After reviewing the contexts in which the court has used the term
"society as a whole," it can be inferred that the court intends for
these awards to repair more than the harm to an individual victim.
Combating impunity-for example, through the dissemination of the
truth about past violations-attacks the roots of many violations and
does not simply solve the case sub judice. The court's broad
interpretation of "society as a whole" is evidence of the dissuasive
intent of certain measures awarded by the court.
B. MEASURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES 1 (1) AND 2 WITH EFFECTS
ON THE "SOCIETY AS A WHOLE"

Explicit reference to the concept of "society as a whole" is the
ideal means to prove the intentions of the Inter-American Court and
its understanding of the concept. However, there is further evidence
for an underlying working theory that assumes that some measures
ordered by the court, pursuant to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the ACHR,
are equally and implicitly directed to the "society as a whole."
It is true that the treaty regime in itself has the most relevant aim
of preventing violations, and thus fulfils a dissuasive, deterrent
function. Nevertheless, it is suggested that these measures, inferred
from Article 2 of the ACHR, cannot be regarded as punitive without
falling prey to an inherent contradiction.9 If the distinction is made
between punitive measures (relating to punishment in criminal law)

90. Id. 191.
91. Article 2, like the treaty regime itself, has as its goal the protection of rights
rather than punishment of violations. See ACHR, supra note 11, art. 2 (requiring
states to take "legislative or other measures ... to give effect to those rights"
protected by the ACHR). The Inter-American Court's compensatory powers,
derived from Article 63(1), are intended to be used only for reparatory purposes,
not punitive ones. See, e.g., Masacre de la Rochela v. Colombia, 2007 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163, $T 6-7 (Concurrent Opinion of Judge Garcia Ramirez)
(May 11, 2007); Garrido v. Argentina, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39,
43-44 (Aug. 27, 1998) (explaining that "the Inter-American Court is not a penal
court," rather its role is to repair the effects of human rights violations); Godinez
Cruz v. Honduras, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 8, 36, (July 21, 1989).

2007] DISSUASIVE MEASURESAND THE "SOCIETYAS A WHOLE"

145

and dissuasive measures (relating to the concept of deterrence),
Article 2 of the ACHR can be labeled dissuasive in the latter sense,
but in no instance punitive in the former: compliance with basic
treaty obligations cannot be regarded as punishment.9 2
1. Non-repetition Guarantees
When non-repetition guarantees are concerned, the Inter-American
Court takes a different position than when addressing reparations to
individual victims.9 3 This position shall be explained in detail
because it reveals that the court understands redress as a more
encompassing concept. Redress can also be directed to society and
has an implicit, exemplary component. The same is not true for
measures of cessation which are directed to restoring the individual
victim's rights, and which sometimes are considered to be a form of

92. Judge Cangado Trindade has taken into account this difficulty, preferring
the terms "dissuasive" or "exemplary" measures in his separate opinions to the
Plan de Sinchez Massacre and Mack Chang judgments. Plan de Sanchez Massacre
v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, 25 (Nov. 19, 2004)
(Reasoned Vote of Judge Can~ado Trindade); Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 7 37, 45, 47, 50 (Nov. 25, 2003) (Reasoned
Vote of Judge Cangado Trindade). In his separate vote on state crimes in the recent
Ituango Massacres decision, he refers to punitive damages as a form of reparation.
Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148,
27,
42 (July 1, 2006) (Reasoned Vote of Judge Canado Trindade). See SHELTON,
supra note 9, at 363 for an argument that non-repetition guarantees could be seen
as containing elements of punishment as well as reparation.
93. See Brian D. Tittemore, Ending Impunity in the Americas: The Role of the
Inter-American System in Advancing Accountability for Serious Crimes Under
InternationalLaw, 12 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 429, 444-45 (2006) (distinguishing
between the Inter-American Court's use of individual reparations, premised on the
right of the victim to be restored to the "status quo ante," and non-repetition
guarantees, which may be a subset of reparations but are preventative in nature). It
should be noted, though, that the Inter-American Court considers that it should
take into account the loss of opportunities that the violation of the right meant for
the person's "life plan." Loayza Tamayo v Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 42,
117, 144 (Nov. 27, 1998) (pointing out that the victim's claims with
respect to her career plans did not fall under the concept of restitution). See
generally SHELTON, supra note 9, at 293, 304-06 (explaining circumstances in
which non-monetary remedies are necessary); Daniel Bodansky, John R. Crook &
Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 833, 847 (2002) (explaining that, in general,
non-repetition guarantees differ from reparations in being forward-looking and
preventative in nature).
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reparation despite the fact that they stem from obligations under
Articles 1 and 2 of the ACHR.94
In Trujillo-Oroza, the court explicitly recognized that nonrepetition guarantees are granted based on the general obligation to
respect, protect, and fulfill Article 1(1) of the ACHR. 95 The judges
state: "Finally, according to the general obligation established in
Article 1(1) of the [ACHR], the State has the obligation to take all
necessary steps to ensure that these grave violations are not repeated,
an obligation whose fulfillment benefits society as a whole. 9 6 In two
earlier cases, non-repetition guarantees were granted in reparation
decisions pursuant to Article 63(1) of the ACHR, but are explicitly
linked to the general obligations arising from Article 2 of the
ACHR. 97 It is also interesting to note that the International Law
Commission considers that non-repetition guarantees point to
"reinforcement of a continuing legal relationship and the focus is on
the future, not the past." 98
The court explained in Garrido: "reparation may also
form of measures intended to prevent a recurrence of the
acts."99 The question in the present argument is whether
considers recurrence as being related only to the individual
to any recurrence of the same acts without reference to the

be in the
offending
the court
victim, or
victim, as

94. Victor Madrigal-Borloz, Damage and Redress in the Jurisprudenceof the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979-2001), in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK

2001,

REPARATIONS: REDRESSING PAST WRONGS

211,

241-52 (George Ulrich & Louise Krabbe Boserup eds., 2003).
95. Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92,
102,
110 (Feb. 27, 2002).
96. Id. 110. See also Masacre de la Rochela v. Colombia, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 163, 277 (May 11, 2007) (mentioning the state's commitment
to comply with the obligations of non-repetition with regard to the victims, their
next of kin, and society as a whole).
97. Durand v. Peru, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68, 143 (Aug. 16,
2000) (discussing state obligations to prevent future violations in conjunction with

a discussion of compensation for victims' relatives); Paniagua-Morales v.
Guatemala, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 37, 174 (Mar. 8, 1998).
98. International Law Commission, Report of the International Law
Commission, at 221, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 2001).
99. Garrido v. Argentina, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, 41 (Aug.
27, 1998) (emphasis added); see Castillo-Pdez v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 43, 48 (Nov. 27, 1998) (labeling reparations a "generic term" for
measures of redress, including non-repetition guarantees).
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would stem from the general obligations under Articles 1(1) and 2 of
the ACHR.
In Castillo-Phez v. Peru, the victims requested a general nonrepetition guarantee, 00 but the court failed to address the matter. Two
years later in Durand v. Peru, the judges stated that, in addition to
"the obligation to investigate, there is another obligation to prevent
any possible commission of involuntary disappearance and punish
the liable parties."'' ° It is suggested that non-repetition guarantees
stem from Articles 1(1) and 2 of the ACHR, but also fulfill the
function of a reparation pursuant to Article 63(1) of the ACHR.
2. The Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute,and Punish
A similar interplay between Article 63(1) and Articles 1(1) and 2
can be found with regard to the obligation to investigate, prosecute,
and punish perpetrators of human rights violations. 0 2 This obligation
can be interpreted as a de facto non-repetition guarantee because
punishing a perpetrator deters future violations.
In Veldsquez-Rodriguez, the Inter-American Court ordered the
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the perpetrators in the
merits' stage of the case, referring to the general obligation under
Article 2.'03 The court also established a general duty to prevent
disappearances. °4 This duty stems exclusively from the obligation to
prevent violations that any state party incurs under operative Article
2 of the ACHR, not under the first division of Article 63.105
However, the obligation has also been considered a form of
reparation under Article 63(1). It was in Caballero-Delgadothat the
court for the first time ordered investigation of the facts and
100. Castillo-Ptiez, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43,
101. Durand,2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68,
102. See ACHR, supra note 11, arts. 1, 2, 63(1).

94.

143 (emphasis added).

103. See Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 4,

174 (July 29, 1988).

104. Id. 188 (explaining that party states have a duty to protect the rights
identified in the ACHR, including the right to life).
105. See International Responsibility for the Promulgation & Enforcement of
Laws in Violation of the Convention (Advisory Opinion), 1994 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) No. 14, 33 (Dec. 9, 1994) (explaining that after ratification of the ACHR,
states should "refrain from adopting measures that conflict with the object and
purpose of the Convention").
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punishment of the perpetrators as a form of reparation. 0 6 This view
is explicitly confirmed in Las Palmerasv. Colombia, where the court
stated that "pursuant to Article 63(1) of the [ACHR] ... the State has

' 7
an obligation to investigate the facts that caused these violations."' 1
Also, in recent cases, the court ordered investigations, prosecutions,
and sanctions of perpetrators in the context of reparation
provisions.'08
At this point, it is apparent that a single order may fulfill several
purposes and, consequently, cannot clearly be subsumed under one
category of measures. This line of reasoning can eventually explain
why the court has hesitated in clearly attributing the orders to one
type of reparation or to a general obligation. Still, the conceptual
difficulty does not weaken the dissuasive effect that non-repetition
guarantees directed to the "society as a whole" are intended to have.
Judge Canqado Trindade explicitly states that non-monetary forms of
reparation "have exemplary or dissuasive purposes, in the sense of
preserving remembrance of the violations occurred, of providing
satisfaction (a feeling of realization of justice) to the next of kin of the
victim, and of contributing to ensure non-recidivism of said violations
(even through human rights training and education)."' 0 9

3. Grantingof LegislativeMeasures
Non-repetition guarantees frequently take the form of legislative
measures." l0 Whereas explicit non-repetition guarantees are mostly

106. Caballero-Delgado v. Colombia, 1995 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 22,
69 (Dec. 8, 1995) (reasoning that reparation decisions do allow for the
consideration of other ACHR provisions, but their primary raison d'Ytre and
foundation stone is to restore the victim's rights and freedoms).
107. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 90, 69
(Dec. 6, 2001).
108. See, e.g., Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 154, T 144-145 (Sept. 26, 2006); Servell6n-Garcia v. Honduras, 2006 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 152,
192-195 (Sept. 21, 2006) (recognizing truth as
an "important means of reparation" in ordering Honduras to identify, prosecute,
and punish those responsible for the human rights violations in question).
109. Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 50
(Nov. 25, 2003) (Reasoned Vote of Judge Canqado Trindade) (emphasis added).
110. See SHELTON, supra note 9, at 279 (noting that the Inter-American Court
frequently requires states to amend their laws or policies in order to prevent further
human rights violations).
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general in terms and scope, legislative measures identify and attempt
to remedy a structural wrong that the court has recognized in its
examination of a case and are de facto non-repetition guarantees."'
Thus, in September 2003, the court in Bulacio v. Argentina ordered
that the guarantee of non-repetition involve the adoption of
legislative measures." 2 Therefore, while the victim may be only one
individual, all individuals in similar situations are also beneficiaries
of the reparation measures.
For example, Guatemala was ordered to reform both Article 132
of the Criminal Code, which refers to the treatment of prisoners who
allegedly represent a danger to the society, 1 3 and Article 201 of the
Criminal Code, which defines the crime of abduction and its
penalties." 4 All persons affected by these regulations would benefit
from a change in the Criminal Code. The court also ordered in other
cases that all necessary legislative and administrative measures be
taken to ensure that a person sentenced to death can ask for penalty
commutation." 5 Due to the fact that there were thirty-five prisoners
on death row who stood to benefit from the court's order at the time,
amending the law to allow for the commutation of a death sentence
6
affected individuals other than the named victims in those cases."1

111. See, e.g., Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42,
159-164 (Nov. 27, 1998) (ordering Peru to bring laws on terrorism and treason
into conformity with Article 2 of the ACHR); Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela,
2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150,
145 (July 5, 2006) (ordering a nonrepetition guarantee that requires Venezuela to adopt standards for the
circumstances of confinement that adhere to international principles); Fermin
Ramirez v. Guatemala, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 126, 130 (June 20,
2005) (calling on the government of Guatemala to bring Article 132 of the
Guatemalan Penal Code in conformity with Article 2 of the ACHR).
112. Bulacio v. Argentina, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100,
162.5
(Sept. 18, 2003).
113. Fermin Ramirez, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 126, 130.
114. Raxcac6 Reyes v. Guatemala, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133,
132 (Sept. 15, 2005).
115. Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
212; Raxcac6 Reyes, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133, 132.
116. See Lorena Seijo, CIDH Pide Regular Indulto [Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights Requests Regulation of Pardons], PRENSA LIBRE,
http://www.prensalibre.com/pl/2005/julio/06/118166.html (last visited Aug. 16,
2007) (discussing three proposed means of amending the Criminal Code of
Guatemala in order to comply with the ACHR).
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Since the Garrido decision, where it approved a friendly
settlement including the adoption of legislation that makes
disappearance a crime, the court has developed the concept of
legislative measures." 7 In a decision just two years earlier, the InterAmerican Commission requested and was denied legislative
measures which would have required that the Military Code of
Justice of Venezuela conform to the ACHR."18 In another
disappearance case, the court observed that Peruvian amnesty laws
were an obstacle to justice." 9 There was, however, no consequence
of that finding in the operative paragraphs of the judgment.
Legislative change was revisited in Loayza Tamayo where the parties
amend
reached a friendly settlement of the case requiring the state to
20
treason.
and
terrorism
of
crimes
the
certain laws to redefine
But only in BarriosAltos v. Peru did the Inter-American Court for
the first time oblige a state to change an existing national law
pursuant to a violation of the ACHR in a disappearance case.' 12 In
that decision, the court ordered the redefinition of the crime of extrajudicial execution as well as the ratification of the International
Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. 122 This decision established an

117. See Garrido v. Argentina, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, 66
(Aug. 27, 1998) (explaining that the Argentine government introduced legislation
criminalizing forced disappearances in an attempt to conform to the InterAmerican Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons); see also TrujilloOroza v. Bolivia, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92, 98 (Feb. 27, 2002)
(holding Bolivia responsible for violating the ACHR and noting that the InterAmerican Court's reparations order will only be satisfied when the bill identifying
forced disappearance as a crime becomes law).
52,
118. El Amparo v. Venezuela, 1996 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 28,
60 (Sept. 14, 1996) (refusing to instruct the Venezuelan government to amend the
Code of Military Justice to conform to the ACHR because the purpose of the InterAmerican Court is to protect the rights of specific individuals).
119. Castillo Pdiez v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, 105 (Nov.
27, 1998) (noting that the Peruvian Amnesty Law hinders investigations and
prevents the victim's next of kin from accessing the courts in order to discover the
truth and obtain reparations).
120. Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, 1 192.5
(Nov. 27, 1998) (requiring Peru to redefine such crimes so that they are in
conformity with the ACHR).
121. Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 87, 44 (Nov.
30, 2001).
122. See id. (obliging Peru to accomplish the reparations within thirty days of
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important precedent in the development of the court's use of
legislative measures.
Since 2002, the court has granted legislative measures more often
than in earlier years, including measures such as the establishment of
a detainee register,'23 the creation of a speedy mechanism to declare a
person missing and presumably dead in the case of disappearances,
and the establishment of necessary legislation for a genetic database
to identify disappeared children.' 24 In Hilaire, the court ordered
Trinidad & Tobago to conduct new criminal trials for certain persons
and required changes to the Offences Against the Person Act.'25 In
Blanco Romero v. Venezuela, the State was ordered to take
legislative measures to make the recourse of habeas corpus effective
in cases of disappearances. 2 6 The Inter-American Court did not
suggest concrete legal arrangements, but added certain precise aims
that the legislation should conform to international standards. 2 '
In a case against the Dominican Republic, the court ordered the
government to adopt the legislative reforms necessary for a late birth
registration procedure, including the availability of effective recourse
to administrative decisions.'28 In Moiwana Community and Yakye
Axd Indigenous Community, the court granted changes in the
regulations on indigenous land titles. 29 In Vargas-Areco, legislation
the agreement).
123. Humberto Sdnchez v. Honduras, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99,
189 (June 7, 2003) (explaining that these records will help ensure that detainees
are being held legally).
124. Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 108,
91 (July 3, 2004).
125. Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 94,
108, 214 (June 21, 2002) (compelling the removal of the obligatory language in
the Act requring the imposition of the death penalty in successfully prosecuted
murder cases).
126. Blanco Romero v. Venezuela, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 138,

104 (Nov. 28, 2005).
127. See id. (clarifying that such international standards include the guarantee of
freedom and respect for life, as well as the prevention of forced disappearances and
doubts as to a person's place of detention).
128. See Girls Yean & Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 130, 239 (Sept. 8, 2005) (emphasizing that such procedures are
necessary to prevent individuals from continuing to live in the Dominican
Republic as stateless persons).
129. See Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
124, $$ 209-211 (June 15, 2005) (guaranteeing members of the Moiwana
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had to be amended in order to prevent the recruitment of children
1 30
into the armed forces.

There are also decisions in which the court ordered measures
implying legislative action on the national level without mentioning
that the measures necessarily have to take the form of an amendment
or adoption of legislation. In Bdmaca Velcisquez, the court ordered
the implementation of a national exhumation program if one did not
yet exist,131 and in Plan de Snchez Massacre, the court stated that
amnesties and similar measures of reprieve are not allowed to
preclude the ability of Guatemala to "investigate, prosecute and
punish those responsible."'' In the Guatemalan context, this may
require a legislative change: The Ley de Amparo may need to be
amended to make amnesties effectively inapplicable in the case of
gross human rights violations.3 Finally, in Palamara Iribarne v.
Chile, the court held that Chile had to take "all measures necessary to
derogate or modify internal norms that are contrary to international
134
law on freedom of thought and expression."'
When linking legislative measures and the concept of "society as a
whole," it is necessary to clarify that the court never put the two
terms in context; they operate separately from each other. However,
pursuant to the foregoing, it is argued that there is an underlying
relationship between "society as a whole" and legislative measures

community that Suriname will return land once occupied by the community);
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 125, 7 225 (June 17, 2005) (requiring Paraguay to adopt domestic measures
that would allow indigenous people to effectively pursue claims to traditional
territories).
130. See Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 155,
77 163-164 (Sept. 26, 2006) (requiring that Paraguay increase the minimum age for
military recruitment to eighteen years of age in accordance with international
standards).
131. Bdmaca Veldsquez v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91,
83 (Feb. 22, 2002).
132. Plan de Sdnchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 116, 99 (Nov. 19, 2004).
133. See generally Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 101,
270 (Nov. 25, 2003) (calling for the legislation to be adjusted to
conform to the ACHR and thus provide "an effective judicial recourse for the
victims").
134. Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, 254

(Nov. 22, 2005) [translation by author].
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that aims to reduce recidivism of violations in the entire InterAmerican system.
Thus, "society as a whole" benefits when laws are amended in a
way that reduces the probability of a recurrence of the facts and
reduces the probability that members of vulnerable groups or
''society as a whole" will fall victim to a serious human rights
violation. It is difficult to imagine that such measures would not
positively impact society, especially because laws are applicable to
all persons under a state's jurisdiction.
C. REPARATION MEASURES BENEFITING THE "SOCIETY AS A
WHOLE"

While the placement of legislative orders in the section on
reparations of the court's decisions confirms that they also enjoy a
reparative nature, the court awards measures that are exclusively
based on Article 63(1) of the ACHR. 35 These too are arguably
intended to have certain dissuasive effects.
1. PublicApology and InstitutionalizedRemembrance
Society benefits from court orders requiring public apologies, the
erection of monuments or memorial plaques, and the naming of
streets or schools. Since 2001 when the court for the first time took
the initiative to order the publication of the judgment and a public
apology, 3 6 it has consistently granted this measure "in order to
prevent a repetition of these events." '37
In Plan de Scnchez Massacre, the court ordered a public apology
and required that it occur in the community concerned and be

135. See, e.g., Mack Chang, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, T 286

(requiring Guatemala to name a street after the victim and place a plaque in her
memory where she died to promote public awareness and avoid recidivism);
Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120,
196 (Mar. 1, 2005) (obligating the State to dedicate a day to children who
disappeared during an internal conflict); Caracazo v. Venezuela, 2002 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 95, T 127 (Aug. 29, 2002) (requiring Venezuela to train law
enforcement officials to protect human rights and limit the use of weapons).
136. Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 88,
TT 79, 81 (Dec. 3, 2001).
137. Id. 799.
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pronounced in or translated into Maya-Achi, the victims' language.138
In addition to providing moral satisfaction to the victims, a public

apology serves to publicize an official account of human rights
violations, and particularly state involvement therein.
With the growing frequency of acknowledgment of state
responsibility, the Inter-American Court no longer orders public
apologies systematically. Judge Garcia-Ramirez notes that a public
apology cannot be more than a formal one, as it is detached from a
feeling of moral regret by the individual perpetrator.13 9 However,
when a victim requests a public apology, the court will grant the
measure as a form of satisfaction, 4 ' even if there has been partial
14
acknowledgment of state responsibility.
The Inter-American Court has ordered the naming of streets in
several cases, 142 with the idea originating from a friendly settlement
between the victims and the State of Ecuador in BenavidesCevallos.143 Often times, the court will order the naming of a school,
especially when the victims were still relatively young. The court
directed states to carry out such measures in Trujillo Oroza,'"
"Street Children, "145 G6mez Paquiyauri Bros. v. Peru146 and

138. Plan de Sinchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 126, 100 (Nov. 19, 2004). Furthermore, the Inter-American Court ordered
that the ACHR and the judgment of the case be translated into Maya-Achi. Id.

102.
139. See La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162,
26-27
(Nov. 29, 2006) (Reasoned Vote of Judge Garcia-Ramirez) (outlining the various
aspects of an apology to include "condemnations of the violations, offers to pass
measures favorable to the victims, and preventing new violations").
140. See, e.g., Goibur v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153,
173 (Sept. 22, 2006) (requiring that senior state authorities participate in the
apology for forced disappearances).
141. See Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
148,
403-407 (July 1, 2006) (ordering the State to also provide appropriate
treatment for the next of kin of the victims, safe conditions for displaced
inhabitants, and a housing program for survivors who lost their homes).
142. See, e.g., Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
101, 286 (Nov. 25, 2003) (ordering Guatemala to rename a commonly used street
to honor the victim).
143. Benavides-Cevallos v. Ecuador, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 38,
48(5) (June 19, 1998).
144. Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92, 122
(Feb. 27, 2002).
145. "Street Children" v. Guatemala, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77,
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Servell6n Garcia v. Honduras.4 7 The court has confirmed that it
believes that memorial activities have an important and viable effect
on the society.'4 8 It stated in "Street Children" that naming an
educational center after murdered street children would "contribute
to raising awareness in order to avoid the repetition of harmful acts
such as those that occurred in the instant case and will keep the
memory of the victims alive.' 49 This statement by the court signifies
that remembering the victims is considered to be a society-related,
encompassing concept. Another example of the court implementing
this concept occurred in Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador where
the order included the introduction of a day honoring children who
have disappeared in El Salvador. 15 0 Additionally, reading the names
of victims in a public forum and ensuring their lasting "presence" in
public spaces by naming a street or square in their honor helps to
inform the public about their cases.
Much like publication of the judgment, these measures raise
awareness of the state's human rights violations in the society and
how the state has dealt with past violations. Without being able to
prove such an assertion empirically in the context of this article, the
publicity of a case and its victims arguably encourages people to
remember past violations and contributes to social reconciliation.
This process should thus lead to democratic stabilization.
The effectiveness of these measures for the "society as a whole,"
however, depends largely on the role the media assumes in a given
country.'
Without the media disseminating reparation measures,
103 (May 26, 2001).
146. See G6mez Paquiyauri Bros. v. Peru, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
110, 236 (July 8, 2004) (explaining that naming the school after the victim will
help prevent similar violations in the future).
147. Servell6n Garcia v. Honduras, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 152,
199 (Sept. 21, 2006).
148. See Trujillo Oroza, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92,
122
(reasoning that such a reparation would raise "public awareness about the need to
avoid the repetition of harmful acts").
149. "Street Children ", 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77, 103.
150. Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
120, 196 (Mar. 1, 2005).
151. See James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statute for an International
Criminal Court, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 404, 407 n.19 (1995) (discussing the fact that
less is done to remedy human rights violations when they are less visible through
the media).
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only a small number of people with a vested interest would learn
about the court's judgments and understand their implications. As
mentioned above, the court has consistently ordered the publication
of its judgments since Cantoral-Benavides.5 2 For example, the court
required publication of the judgment in a state's official gazette and a
newspaper of national dissemination. 5 3 In Palamara Iribarne, a
freedom of expression case resulting in the publication of a
previously censored book, the court ordered the publication of the
proven facts in the official gazette and the entire judgment on the
official website of the Chilean government. 54 Pursuant to the
decision in Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, the government of
Peru had to broadcast the judgment several times on Peruvian radio
and television. 155
2. Training of Public Officials, Improvement of Prison Conditions
and Protectionfor JudicialOfficials
Finally, the Inter-American Court grants three additional types of
measures that are implicitly directed to the "society as a whole." In
Caracazo v. Venezuela, the court required human rights training
programs for public officials, which theoretically would benefit
every person who comes into contact with public officials. 156 The
second measure, the reformation of the detention system, would
152. See Cantoral-Benavides v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 88,
7 79 (Dec. 3, 2001) (requiring Peru to publish important parts of the judgment in
two newspapers that have a national circulation). Publication of a court judgment
occurred for the first time in Barrios Altos as part of a settlement agreement
between the parties. Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
87, 44(e) (Nov. 30, 2001).
153. See, e.g., La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162,
237 (Nov. 29, 2006); Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 155, T 162 (Sept. 26, 2006); Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, 2006 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)No. 148, T 410 (July 1, 2006).
154. Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, 252
(Nov. 22, 2005).
155. Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
160, T 445 (Nov. 25, 2006).
156. See, e.g., La Cantuta, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, 7 240-241
(ordering ongoing trainings for law enforcement on the use of weapons in all
situations, as well as trainings for judicial servants on international human rights
standards); Caracazo v. Venezuela, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 95, 127
(Aug. 29, 2002) (observing that Venezuela should instruct its police officers on the
proper use of force even in emergency situations).
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directly benefit prisoners, but would also benefit "society as a
whole" by facilitating the reintegration of prisoners into society. 15 7 In
Tibi v. Ecuador, the court held that Ecuadorian judicial and
prosecution personnel, law enforcement and penitentiary officers,
including medical, psychiatric, and psychological personnel, had to
attend training programs in human rights standards relevant to
detention facilities.158 The court specifically mentioned the
importance of civil participation in the program. 519
Furthermore, in Caracazo, the court linked the training of public
officials to the general obligation of non-repetition:
It is necessary to avoid by all means any repetition of the circumstances
described. The State must adopt all necessary provision [sic] to this end,
and specifically those for education and training of all members of its
armed forces and its security agencies on principles and provisions of
human rights protection and regarding the limits to which the use of
weapons by law enforcement officials is subject, even in a state of
0
emergency.16

In Huilca-Tecse, the court endorsed an agreement between the
parties and ordered the creation of a human rights and labor law
course without designating a specific audience. 16' In contrast, in
Mack Chang, the court specified that public officials must attend
62
professional human rights training.
Pursuant to Gutirrez-Soler v. Colombia, human rights training
has to be provided for public officials in the military justice system
due to the ill-treatment and torture the victim suffered while illegally

157. See Tibi v. Ecuador, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114,
142(6)
(Sept. 7, 2004) (noting that Article 5 of the ACHR references the rehabilitation of
prisoners so that they can later rejoin society as one purpose of detention).
158. Id. 263.
159. Id. 264.
160. Caracazo v. Venuzuela, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 95,
127
(Aug. 29, 2002).
161. See Huilca-Tecse v. Peru, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 121,
113
(Mar. 3, 2005) (establishing a yearly course on human rights and labor law at a
public university in Peru to honor the victim).
162. See Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101,
282 (Nov. 25, 2003) (ordering the Guatemalan government to instruct military,
law enforcement, and security personnel on how to prevent human rights
violations).
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detained. 6 3 Additionally, the court mandated that medical personnel
in detention centers, as well as judges and prosecution officers,
receive training on the Istanbul Protocol, a set of international
guidelines that describes how officials should document and assess
accusations of torture alleged by detainees.' 6' In Mapiriptin
Massacre, the court ordered that all-rank members of the Colombian
armed forces participate in permanently established educational
programs in human rights.'65 In a case concerning prolonged illegal
detention, poor detention conditions, and ill-treatment in custody, the
court ordered Honduras to establish a training program for detention
center employees.1 66 Additionally, prison conditions, especially
alimentation and hygiene, had to be improved according to
international standards. 67 The court has granted similar measures in
Montero-Aranguren v. Venezuela where it specifically mentioned
168
that the conditions had to be improved for all prisoners.

163. Guti~rrez-Soler v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 132,
106 (Sept. 12, 2005).
164. See id. 109-110 (noting that these trainings should provide staff with the
technical and scientific knowledge necessary to evaluate the bases of claims of
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment).
165. Mapiripdn Massacre v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
134, 316 (Sept. 15, 2005); see La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 162,
240-242 (Nov. 29, 2006) (mandating that Peru establish programs
to train members of the armed forces on the appropriate use of force and judicial
officers on international human rights instruments).
166. L6pez-Alvarez v. Honduras, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 141,
210 (Feb. 1, 2006); see Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 149,
250 (July 4, 2006) (requiring Brazil to establish educational
programs for staff working in mental health institutions); Montero-Aranguren v.
Venezuela, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, T 146 (July 5, 2006)
(ordering the improvement of prisoner accommodations by requiring Venezuela to
increase air flow and sunlight to cells, ensure hygienic conditions and privacy in
bathrooms, and provide prisoners with the resources necessary to educate
themselves while incarcerated); Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, 2006 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, T 452 (Nov. 25, 2006) (requiring Peru to educate
law enforcement officers on the international standards applicable to the treatment
of prisoners during periods of social unrest in prisons).
167. See L6pez-Alvarez, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 141, 209; see
also Lori Berenson-Mejia v. Peru, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 119, 241
(Nov. 25, 2004) (requiring Peru to alter conditions at Yanamayo Prison to conform
to international standards and transfer prisoners suffering from altitude sickness
due to the facility's elevation of almost 3,800 meters above sea level).
168. See Montero-Aranguren, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 146
(requiring that living conditions respect prisoners' "dignity as human beings").
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Very recently, the court has for the first time ordered that the state
has to guarantee an adequate security and protection system in order
for judicial officials, prosecutors, and investigators to be able to carry
out their work of ensuring the non-repetition of massacres. The court
has also ordered the protection of witnesses, victims, and their next
169
of kin in cases of serious violations of human rights.
It is very clear in these cases that it is not the individual victim or
the next of kin who benefit from the reparation measure granted, but
a much larger section of society, and arguably the "society as a
whole." Moreover, often the victim is not the beneficiary of
measures requiring officer training and better prison conditions
because he or she will likely be unconditionally released from the
prison as a consequence of an order for cessation of the violation.17 0
This can be considered compelling evidence that the court awards
measures of reparation clearly beyond the individual victim of a
case, supporting the characterization of the court's measures as
dissuasive.

III. DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION AND
"SOCIETY AS A WHOLE"
"Society as a whole," as a working theory, underlies not only
reparation awards and measures related to cessation. The InterAmerican Court's jurisprudence on democracy and the rule of law is
inspired by the same working theory as well. Although only one case
has addressed an alleged violation of Article 23 of the ACHR,
providing little textual evidence for such a relationship, 7 ' the
rationale of "society as a whole" can be understood to be linked to
democracy, participation, and the rule of law.
The rule of law in a democratic society requires access to justice.
7 2 and has
The court confirmed this link in Claude-Reyes v. Chile,"

169. Masacre de la Rochela v. Colombia, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
163, 297 (May 11, 2007).
170. See, e.g., Gutirrez-Soler v. Colombia, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 132, 106 (ordering human rights training for public officials in the military

justice system).
171. Yatama v. Nicaragua, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23,
2005).

172. See Claude-Reyes v. Chile, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151,
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indicated that it may interpret access to justice in collective terms
when granting a measure that shall provide non-discriminatory
access to justice for the victim's community. 173 While the rule of law
and access to justice are based on the provisions in Articles 1(1), 2,
8, and especially 25 of the ACHR, 174 the reference to democracy is
rooted in several separate treaty provisions and Article 23 of the
5
7

ACHR.1

In a 1986 advisory opinion, the court observed: "Representative
democracy is the determining factor throughout the system of which
the Convention is a part.

' 17 6

This is an intrinsic element of the

purpose of the Organization of American States, as expressed in the
Charter: "Representative democracy is an indispensable condition for
the stability, peace and development of the region."' 7 7 The idea is a
central principle of the ACHR 178 and was explained more fully in the
Democratic Charter which stresses the intrinsic link between
representative democracy, participation, and the rule of law. 17 9
Article 2 of the Democratic Charter states:

(Sept. 19, 2006); Balde6n Garcia v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
147, 144 (Apr. 6, 2006); see also Ximenes-Lopes, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 149, 192 (recognizing that states have a duty to guarantee that individuals
have access to judicial remedies if their human rights are violated).
173. See Balde6n Garcia, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, 203.
174. See ACHR, supra note 11, arts. 1(1), 2, 8, 25 (providing judicial protection
of fundamental rights, freedom to exercise fundamental rights, the right to a fair
trial, and access to judicial recourse to ensure those rights).
175. See id. art. 23 (guarding the right, inter alia, to participate in government,
vote, and freely choose representatives).
176. The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Advisory Opinion), 1986 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14, 34 (May 9,
1986).
177. Charter of Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, Preamble, 2
U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 48, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, amended by Protocol of Cartagena, Dec.
5, 1985 25 I.L.M. 527, amended by Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 33
I.L.M. 1009.
178. See ACHR, supra note 11, Preamble, art. 1 (recognizing that creating
"within the framework of democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and
social justice" is one of the convention's purposes).
179. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter,
arts. 2, 3, 6, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289, available at http://www.oas.org/
OASpage/eng/Documents/DemocracticCharter.htm (emphasizing the importance
of representative democracy, free and fair elections, separation of powers, and
citizen participation in decisions pertaining to their own development).
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The effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for the rule
of law and of the constitutional regimes of the member states of the
Organization of American States. Representative democracy is
strengthened and deepened by permanent, ethical, and responsible
participation of the citizenry within
a legal framework conforming to the
0
respective constitutional order.18

Article 8 acknowledges the fundamental importance of human
rights for consolidation of representative democracy. 81 Similar
reasoning can be found in the European Council, where the European
Court of Human Rights refers to the "public legal order," and
especially democracy, as the common form of political organization
of the state.'82
The first contentious case concerning a violation of Article 23 of
the ACHR is Yatama v. Nicaragua.13 The court decided that the
requirement to run for office through a political party does not
conform to Article 23 of the ACHR.1 4 In particular, the concept of a
political party was found to be unfamiliar to the customs of the
indigenous community concerned, effectively barring access to the
passive right to vote and political participation.'
In Yatama, the court established an indirect link between Article
23 of the ACHR, the idea of representative democracy, and "society
as a whole.' 8 6 The judges argued that the devices for political

180. Id.art. 2.
181. Id. art. 8.
182. Zdanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, 98 (2006), http://www.echr.coe.
int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database (follow "HUDOC"
hyperlink; then enter "58278/00" in application number field); Refah Partisi v.
Turkey, App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98,
91 (2003),
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+
database (follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then enter one of the application numbers
into the application number field). See generally Loizidou v. Turkey, App.
15318/89 (1995), http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/
HIUDOC+database (follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then enter "15318/89" in
application number field). I appreciate Dinah Shelton's most valuable
recommendation to draw this parallel, and to link the concept to cessation
measures.
183. Yatama v. Nicaragua, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23,

2005).
184. Id. 218-219, 229.
185. Id.7218.
186. Id. 259.
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representation must permit the communities concerned to be able to
intervene in the decision-making process, regarding both issues of
"society as a whole" and their specific concerns. 8 7 Taking into
account that the Inter-American system values representative
democracy, and therefore the contribution that each citizen may
make to the democratic life of the countries, it seems not too farfetched to claim that the "society as a whole" is benefiting when
participation is ever more inclusive. Although the textual link
between the two concepts is rather implicit, future development
might shed light as to how the court understands the relationship
between participation and "society as a whole." Nevertheless, society
will benefit from the reparation measure ordered in Yatama: the
electoral laws of Nicaragua have to be changed in order to allow
candidates from all groups of society to run for office. 8 This
measure will clearly have an effect on "society as a whole."

CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
As has been shown, the Inter-American Court consistently orders
measures that are either explicitly directed to "society as a whole," or
have important beneficiary effects on the society or vulnerable groups
within the society. The court links the concept to the right to the truth
and to impunity. Concern for "society as a whole" is an underlying
working theory of the court.
As argued, "other forms of reparation" and, especially non-repetition
guarantees, are awarded in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the ACHR,
and are ordered with a view towards the dissuasive effect regarding the
repetition of similar violations. Such effects are most important in
states where systematic and gross violations have occurred and where
the past may constitute a significant obstacle to reconciliation and
transition to democracy.18 9

187. Id. (stating in the Spanish original: "[U]na representaci6n adecuada que les
permita intervenir en los procesos de decisi6n sobre las cuestiones nacionales, que
conciernen a la sociedad en su conjunto, y los asuntos particulares que atafien a
dichas comunidades .... " (emphasis added)).
188. Id. 258-259.
189. See generally Arturo Carrillo, Justice in Context: The Relevance of InterAmerican Human Rights Law and Practice to Repairing the Past, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 504, 504-38 (Pablo de Greiffed., 2006).
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Up to now, the court has not considered itself competent to order
the establishment of a general reparation program. 9° While such a
consideration might be desirable for the future, even more
importance should be assigned to non-monetary reparation measures
directed to "society as a whole." Although the court does not
consider society as the injured party in human rights violations, it
awards measures with effects beyond the individual victim under
Articles 1(1) and 2 of ACHR. The non-monetary benefits of the
reparation measures are explicitly assigned to all members of society.
As seen throughout this article, the importance of non-monetary
measures is especially apparent when examining cases concerning
the right to the truth. Beyond what has been shown, Judges Abreu
Burelli and Garcia Ramirez assert in The Peace Community of San
Jose de Apartad6 that provisional measures may also reach "a
plurality of persons. '"191

While this Article has explored the intent and legal argument
related to the "society as a whole," juridical studies cannot provide
the necessary methods to establish whether the measures granted will
have the intended effects. It is important to note that a legal argument
cannot empirically test the causal relationship and intensity between
suggested measures and dissuasive effects. The court makes social
assumptions that cannot and shall not be tested here. The intent of
the court can, however, be clearly established. By awarding nonmonetary, structural measures instead of ordering extensive
programs for monetary compensation, the court can address the root
of violations and aim to prevent the possible "buying-off' of human
rights violations.1 9z By enlarging the group of beneficiaries of nonmonetary measures through a consistent and effective interpretation

190. See Vargas-Areco v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 155,
136(d)(xi), 144 (Sept. 26, 2006) (denying the representatives' request for a law
offering "reparation to all victims of death, torture, abuse, and mistreatment while
in compulsory military service in Paraguay" and instead naming those found to be
injured parties).
191. Peace Community of San Jos6 de Apartad6 Regarding Colombia
8 (Considerations) (Feb. 2,
(Provisional Measure), 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
2006).

219192. See La Cantuta v. Peru, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162,
222, 239 (Nov. 29, 2006) (awarding monetary compensation to victims' families,
while emphasizing Peru's non-monetary obligations such as the duty to train
prosecutors and judges).
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of Articles 1(1), 2, and 63(1) of the ACHR, the court can pay tribute
to the need to give systemic answers to systemic problems. By
intending to solve these systemic problems, reparation measures and
non-repetition guarantees granted in individual cases fulfill a
dissuasive and exemplary function with regard to future violations.
The Inter-American Court's reparation jurisprudence is unique in
international law, understanding both the individual and the "society
as a whole" as beneficiaries of the measures it orders. The court
attaches great importance to non-repetition guarantees. Such rulings
are oriented toward the future and are not strictly concerned with
repairing the past. In this sense, society is paramount, not as the
injured party, but as the fundamental entity where respectful and
peaceful life of all individuals can take place in the future, despite
the past violations.

